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I. Globalization  
Any statement such as "Developing countries are now getting increasingly globalized" 
can be properly understood only in contrast with the paradigm of development that most 
developing countries were following in the ‘50s and ‘60s, and also by and large in the 
‘70s. Developing countries have always been a part of the global economy. They all 
participated in international trade through exports and imports of goods and services. 
They received capital from abroad as foreign investment and as aid and transfers, and 
sometimes also as loans. They also exported a part of their savings not only as repayment 
of loans and repatriation of investments, but also as flight of capital through legal or 
illegal channels. They all felt, in different degrees, the impact of changes in the 
international economic environment such as business cycles, fluctuations in exchange 
rates or changes in terms of trade. So developing countries were never outside the arena 
of the global economy.  
Indeed, it is not implausible to argue that most developing countries remained 
underdeveloped because of their disadvantageous participation in the global economy. 
This was especially so in the colonial period, when their surpluses were drained away to 
the industrial countries. Even after that, most of their economies were relegated to 
producing and exporting primary products with declining prices or low-technology 
manufactures, with sluggish growth in productivity. Participation in trade and global transactions did not appear to the developing countries as conducive to their economic 
transformation.  
Because of such perceptions and because of the dominant views about development 
during those days, most developing countries until about the early 1970s followed 
policies that militated against their integration with world trade and finance. Almost all of 
them had built up walls of protection on their agriculture and industry through tariffs, 
quantitative restrictions and a plethora of non-tariff barriers on imports and many forms 
of restrictions even on their exports. The rationale of such policies of protection, known 
as import substitution strategies, was to increase the effective rates of return on domestic 
activities from enlarging domestic markets. These in effect not only reduced their growth 
of imports, but also by diverting resources from less profitable exporting activities, 
reduced their growth of exports. Capital flows to developing countries during that period 
were relatively small and confined mainly to foreign aid and multilateral institutional 
lending. The limited amount of foreign investment that flowed in faced many restrictions 
of procedural hurdles and fiscal disincentives.  
The impact of such inward-looking policies was felt not only in slowing down the 
process of globalization, but also in distorting the prices and production structure of these 
countries, resulting in inefficiencies and losses in potential output. However, by the mid-
1970s, several changes in the international economic environment had diluted the appeal 
of these policies. First, the GATT round of negotiations had succeeded in initiating a 
steady process of reduction of trade barriers in the industrial countries. Several 
developing countries took advantage, increasing their growth of exports. A number of 
East Asian countries shifted their policies from inward-looking to outward-looking 
strategies and through improvement in efficiencies, succeeded in raising the rates of 
growth of their GDP. As the process of trade liberalization in industrial countries and 
growth in world demand continued, several developing countries came out of their export 
pessimism and moved towards an outward-orientation in their policies.
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Secondly, the international inflationary situation, expanding public expenditure in the 
United States following the Vietnam war, and the excess supply of dollars that eventually 
led to the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s, also allowed 
developing countries to receive higher unit values for their exports. That neutralized, to a 
large extent, whatever tendency there was towards declining terms of trade for 
developing countries, which had earlier provided the theoretical basis of the import-
substitution strategy.
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Thirdly, and more importantly, the aftermath of the oil crisis, first in 1972-73 and then in 
1978-79, changed the whole regime of international capital flows, as surpluses from oil-
money searched for vents of deployment as loans or investment. Many developing 
countries were able to access international markets at negligible real interest rates, and in 
spite of the dwindling flow of concessional assistance to developing countries, there was 
a substantial rise in the flow of international capital, especially as loanable funds to these 
countries.
3 The spurt in the flow of foreign direct investment came much later, around the 
1990s, but the multinational corporations that were the main channels of such investment were undergoing fundamental changes in the nature of their operations. They were 
becoming increasingly footloose, with different stages of their activities spread out in 
different countries. Intense competition among the companies in the demand and supply 
of technology as well as of inputs and outputs were reducing their monopoly-rents on 
these activities. This had allowed several developing countries to make use of 
multinationals to improve their capabilities.  
In response to the changes in the international economic environment, developing 
countries were gradually changing their policies and moving towards globalization. It is 
after the debt crisis of the early 1980s, however, that this process was hastened and many 
developing countries started adopting programmes of reforms that made increased 
globalization or integration with the world economy their stated objectives.  
By the end of the 1980s, the policy paradigm of most developing countries had 
undergone a change, moving from inward-looking, import-substituting, regulatory 
regimes to outward-looking, export-promoting market-oriented policies. As a result, for 
most developing countries the share of foreign trade in GDP, the share of foreign capital 
in total savings and all other indices of globalization kept on increasing. By the mid-
1990s, several developing countries had almost fully integrated their trade and payments 
systems with the international economy, making current as well as capital accounts fully 
convertible. Others kept some restrictions on capital accounts while making current 
accounts almost completely convertible. Nearly all developing countries became 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), subjecting them to the discipline of 
non-discriminatory trade liberalization. Even those countries that did not fully open up 
their trade and payments systems had to accept that whatever restrictions they maintained 
would only be temporary and that they would have to adjust in time to the full 
implications of globalization.  
II. Financial requirements of adjusting to globalization  
Countries adjusting to globalization and opening up to international trade and payments 
required finance. This was recognized as early as 1944, when the IMF was created at the 
Bretton Woods Conference, to provide balance of payments support to countries for 
maintaining an open trade system with convertible current accounts.
4 Although the IMF 
was open to membership by all countries and several developing countries actively 
participated in the Bretton Woods Conference, the design of IMF support at that time was 
meant mainly to serve industrial countries exiting World War II with devastated 
economies. They wanted to restore an orderly and expanding trading system, and to 
increase the volume of world output and trade through appropriate monetary and 
exchange rates policies. It was recognized that in that process, countries might often face 
problems of balance of payment deficits. If such deficits were temporary and reversible 
because they were caused by reversible, exogenous factors, these countries would need 
finance to tide over the period when such deficits were incurred. But if these deficits were 
caused by changes in the international environment that were not temporary or reversible, 
the countries would have to adjust their prices and production structures through changes 
in policy. During the period of adjustment, they would need finance so that they did not have to compress their expenditure too much or follow policies that were too 
deflationary. The IMF was expected to provide that finance as a medium-term loan to be 
repaid in 3 to 5 years, and to monitor the spending of that money and the implementation 
of the policies needed for adjustment set as conditions for receiving that finance.  
In the first 20-25 years of the IMF, several industrial countries drew on such balance of 
payments support for adjustment. However, the major part of their external capital 
requirements, until private capital flows within the industrial countries were fully 
revived, was met by the United States Marshall Plan for war-ravaged European 
economies.
5 The Bretton Woods Conference also created the World Bank to provide 
long-term assistance to adjusting countries to finance investments for augmenting 
production capacities in tradable sectors as well as infrastructures. But industrial 
countries did not have to use much finance from the World Bank, as the Marshall Plan 
aid was more than fully able to meet their requirements. By 1958, when the Marshall 
Plan ended, international capital markets had revived sufficiently in industrial countries 
to meet each other’s investment requirements. By the 1970s, they could also meet, 
through loans, swaps and other arrangements among themselves, the need for balance of 
payments support for adjustment that the IMF was meant to provide. After the end of the 
1970s, the industrial countries needed hardly any finance from the IMF.  
The case with developing countries was, however, altogether different. From the very 
beginning of the Bretton Woods period, developing countries insisted, both at Conference 
Forums and at Executive Board meetings, that their balance of payments problems were 
different from those of the industrial countries.
6 They also required not only different 
policy designs but also a substantially larger amount of adjustment finances, compared 
with the requirements of the industrial countries. In fact, at the Bretton Woods 
Conference itself, developing country delegates tried hard to incorporate "development" 
as an objective and purpose of the IMF, as elaborated in its Article I. They pointed out 
that the requirements of following that objective were not the same as those of pursuing 
"orderly development of trade and payment", which was then accepted as the Fund’s 
main purpose. This was not accepted by the major industrial countries, which refused to 
dilute the functions of international institutions in charge of the monetary management of 
the world economy with any special consideration for development.
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The reasons for rejecting the developing countries’ concern at the very inception of the 
IMF would explain to a large extent the constraints on an international financial 
institution like the IMF in managing the financial requirements of globalization of 
developing economies. The problems of development, according to the major industrial 
countries’ representatives, were related to long-term investment and capital formation. 
Those were supposed to be the domain of the World Bank. The balance of payments 
problems of all countries, whether developed or developing, were related to expenditures 
exceeding income or the value of output and the only way to solve them was to bring 
down expenditures to the level of output. Underlying this proposition was an assumption 
that the level of output would generally be at the maximum with full employment, which 
would be ensured by wage flexibility. Within that level of output, the optimal production 
of tradables, of exportables and importables, are determined by the exchange rate. In that framework, a balance of payment problem would essentially be a demand-management 
problem. In the original Fund model, this was related mainly to money supply or credit 
management in an open trade economy with price-wage flexibility and perfect 
competition.
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For developing countries, the IMF prescriptions, derived from the Articles and 
discussions at the Bretton Woods Conference, were simple. "Go to the World Bank to 
supplement bilateral assistance to augment resources for long-term investment in order to 
expand your capacities. But at any point of time, you produce the maximum output given 
your capacity through perfect competition and complete wage-price flexibility. After that 
your balance of payments problems are exactly the same as any other country. You must 
reduce your expenditures to the level of your capacity output by reducing money supply 
and credit creation. With a fixed nominal exchange rate, as agreed at Bretton Woods, a 
fall in price-level will depreciate the real exchange rate, increase your level of exports 
and reduce your level of imports – eliminating your current accounts deficit and solving 
your balance of payments problems."  
The provision for balance of payments support by the IMF in this model was only to 
facilitate a smoother adjustment of expenditure to output. Instead of reducing 
expenditures immediately and precipitating a severe deflation, the IMF assistance would 
allow the country concerned a somewhat longer time to adjust. But the amount of 
assistance should be so calibrated as to not allow the country to postpone adjustment and 
thereby resist the solution of the problem. There was always the problem of the moral 
hazard. In softening the immediate blow of demand repression, if the IMF provided too 
much finance to carry on without effecting hard policy changes, the problems could 
magnify to generate a more severe crisis in the future. So the founders of the IMF insisted 
not only on making the amount of finance very limited but also on disbursing them on 
conditions of the country’s fulfilling the policy performance.
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The Fund model  
The initial Fund model of demand-management mainly through monetary policy was 
gradually modified to incorporate other variables that affected aggregate demand.
10 
However, the Fund model should have kept evolving with changes in the Fund’s job 
description over time, and in response to the requirements of the changing clientele. Until 
the early 1970’s, the Fund’s policy-prescriptions were centered around defending the 
fixed exchange rate system, though the details had to be adjusted to changes from an 
initial dollar-shortage to the subsequent dollar-surplus international economic 
environment. After the Bretton Woods system broke down between 1971 and 1973, the 
Fund’s job changed from supporting the fixed exchange rates to promoting exchange rate 
stability, which allowed them the theoretical justification of getting involved with 
practically all aspects of a country’s economic policy. The Fund’s clientele had also 
changed in the intervening period. While in the 1950s and 1960s many industrial 
countries drew on the Fund’s financial support, by the 1970s the Fund’s clientele had 
become almost entirely confined to developing countries.  It was increasingly apparent to the Fund staff and the Executive Board that the 
predominantly monetarist model – even after incorporating some Keynesian variables of 
demand-management – did not work well with developing countries.
11 Quite a number of 
countries that entered a Fund programme of adjustment to a balance of payments crisis 
had to prolong their process of adjustment through repetitive programmes. That would 
have suggested that the adjustment problems of developing countries could not be solved 
in a short period. The usual Fund standby programmes were for a period of one year, with 
the repayment obligations for the Fund’s loans spread over 3 to 5 years. That worked 
quite well with industrial countries, but most developing countries asked for extensions 
of the period of adjustment. The Fund had to accommodate these requests, as otherwise 
many of these countries would have defaulted in their repayments to the Fund. As a 
result, quite a few of these countries had a number of successive standby programmes 
dealing with the same balance of payments problem. In spite of that, several of them went 
off track and gave up the programmes in the course of their implementation. Sometimes 
the Fund found itself providing support through successive programmes to countries to 
enable them to repay the Fund’s over-dues. There were of course a number of cases of 
success when the balance of payments deficits that called for the Fund’s support were 
reversed. But even in those cases, the countries often found that while their balance of 
payments had improved, their growth performance or unemployment had deteriorated. 
More often than not, the improved payments situations could not be sustained.  
The Fund model and the policy prescriptions based on it are sometimes described as 
"one-size fits all" programmes recommended to all countries irrespective of their nature 
or stage of development. This criticism is not quite fair, because even in the 1960s and 
1970s, the specific programmes of the Fund differed from each other in terms of the 
extent of policy corrections, their sequencing and mix of instruments, as well as the 
quantum of support. From the late 1970s and during the 1980s and 1990s, when the Fund 
introduced a series of three-year programmes with eight or more years of repayment as 
under its Extended Financing Facility or Structural Adjustment or Extended Structural 
Adjustment Facilities, the nature of the policy prescriptions underwent significant 
changes.  
It is also unfair to allege that the Fund did not take into account the specific conditions of 
a country’s economy in formulating its adjustment programmes. For most countries the 
Fund would recommend lowering the fiscal deficit and the rate of inflation, but the extent 
would vary from country to country, and the method of reduction would also be widely 
different. The variations in interest rates and exchange rates could also be large – for 
some they would be prescribed to rise, and for others to fall. On the details of many other 
policies, especially when they relate to structural changes, the prescriptions would be 
very different. It is quite possible to argue that the Fund sometimes made mistakes in 
recommending a particular policy, but this would be due more to complexities of the 
problems and difficulties in identifying, ex ante, their effective solutions. But it would be 
too simplistic to attribute them to the Fund’s following a uniform policy standard 
irrespective of the problematic differences.  The impression that the Fund always prescribes the same set of policies to all countries 
has been caused mainly by a bias in the Fund’s approach to the balance of payments 
problem for demand-management policies. The institutional requirements of successfully 
dealing with its clientele led the Fund to change the details of its policy prescriptions to 
developing countries over time. But the Fund found it difficult to move away from the 
demand-management bias of its early days, and to get involved with the supply-
management problems that characterized the balance of payments difficulties of 
developing countries. The Fund was happy to leave the supply-management problems of 
developing countries to the World Bank, which was expected to support their long-term 
investment. Its own supply-side concerns were limited to promoting free market 
competition with price-wage flexibility, which was expected to produce the maximum 
output given the stocks of capital, labour and other resources. The Fund did not get into 
problems of investment or growth. Nor did it concern itself with the possibilities of 
market failure. The right prices with a competitive framework would provide the right 
incentives to attract the right amount of investment and the right kind of technology 
leading to sustainable growth. Changing the real interest rates and the real exchange rates 
were practically the only two supply-side instruments with which the IMF was concerned 
– one dealing with the inter-temporal allocation of resources, the other dealing with the 
allocation between tradables and non-tradables. With prices determined in the 
competitive equilibrium framework, real interest rates depended on nominal interest 
rates, which in turn were determined by money supply that entered into the Fund model 
as an instrumental variable. Similarly, with nominal exchange rates as fixed parameters 
under the Bretton Woods system, real exchange rates were determined endogenously 
with all other prices. If there was a dis-equilibrium between the demand and supply of 
exportables and importables, competitive prices change to bring about the equilibrium. If 
that does not happen, there is a "fundamental dis-equilibium" when the parameterially 
fixed nominal exchange rates will be allowed to change in order to restore equilibrium.  
This preoccupation with demand-side management to solve all balance of payments 
problems led the Fund to prescribe austerity, i.e., fiscal repression and a lowering of the 
fiscal deficit mainly through the reduction of public expenditures, and tightening money 
supply and credit expansion in all Fund programmes. The indiscriminate use of this 
approach, without incorporating corrective actions to neutralize its efforts on the supply-
side and the long-run problems of development, has attracted the most criticism for the 
IMF approach. The developing countries that approached the Fund for accommodation 
would sometimes already be in the grip of a severe depression – a policy of further 
demand-repression might be able to produce a trade surplus by reducing imports more 
than exports and enable the country to meet its debt services obligation to its creditors – 
but only at a great cost to its consumption standards and development prospects. Insisting 
on the reduction of fiscal deficits often resulted in the reduction of public expenditure for 
investment and for social development programmes, as other items of expenditure such 
as administration, defense or interest payments were often very inflexible in the short run. 
Similarly, increased interest rates and lack of credit resulting from financial repression 
produced a repression of investments and contraction of industrial output, disrupting the 
process of development. During the East Asian crisis, the Fund recommended in addition 
to sharp interest rate hikes, structural measures such as closing down banks with large non-performing assets to promote competition and efficiency, resulting in the near-
collapse of banking systems. While preventing financial profligacy was undoubtedly 
important, as was the need for disciplining the errant banks, the application of the 
medicine should have been properly gradated and complemented with measures to check 
side-effects, so that the patient did not die in the end.  
As mentioned earlier, developing countries insisted from the inception of the Bretton 
Woods period that the nature of their balance of payments problems was fundamentally 
different from that of developed industrial countries, and could not be separated from the 
problems of development. Increasing exports with a sustained expansion of revenue 
without declining terms of trade would depend upon the composition of outputs and a 
steadily rising productivity of the tradable sector. That would require increased 
investment, which expanded capacity with the latest technology, while investment itself 
would be determined by the prospects of growth and confidence in policies that promoted 
growth. Accordingly, an essential precondition for a sustainable improvement of balance 
of payments was that the economy grew steadily with stable policies that raised 
investors’ confidence. Any set of measures that disrupted the process of growth was not 
conducive to sustainable growth of exports and therefore could not solve the country’s 
balance of payments problems.  
The IMF has not been very comfortable with designing programmes for balance of 
payments improvement with growth. Under a demand-management programme, if 
domestic demand can be sufficiently depressed, a country can always generate a trade 
surplus to meet the obligations of debt servicing by reducing imports and releasing 
domestic products for exports. But it is very difficult to achieve growth of output in the 
country. The variables that determine growth are much less tractable, and policies can 
only create an appropriate environment for growth without ensuring that all the actors in 
the economy will behave in a way that actually produces growth. The IMF considers 
itself primarily a monetary institution concerned about safeguarding its resources and the 
ability of the countries it supports to repay what they borrow. For that, demand-
management policies appear much less risky than uncertain growth-promoting policies. 
But the experience with implementing Fund-supported programmes have amply 
demonstrated that simple demand-management policies that do not provide for expanding 
capacity and development, in most cases fail to work. They do not produce a sustainable 
improvement in balance of payments, and arrears tend to develop even on the repayment 
of IMF borrowings, not to speak of the possibility of defaults in the repayment 
obligations to commercial creditors.  
This became particularly clear after the debt crisis. In the early 1980s several Latin 
American countries, which had earlier borrowed heavily from commercial banks at 
almost negative real interest rates, came to the point of defaulting on their debts when 
interest rates, especially in the United States, registered a sharp increase. Several 
countries at that time adopted Fund programmes of adjustment to eliminate the payments 
deficits, and the success of these programmes crucially depended upon the revival of new 
credits from commercial banks to finance new investment. Despite the fact that a number 
of countries had achieved impressive trade surpluses, new credits were not forthcoming. That was mainly because investors did not have the confidence that the countries’ growth 
performances would improve and that the potential returns on their investments would 
fully materialize, because improvements in trade surplus were caused primarily by 
demand-repression and deflationary policies.  
All this led to a serious rethinking about the design of Fund programmes that could 
produce adjustment with growth. The Fund’s Research Department brought out several 
papers extending earlier monetary models to design financial programmes that ensured 
adjustment with growth. There was a famous Fund seminar on "Growth Oriented 
Adjustment".
12  The Mexican programmes in the mid-1980s for the first time explicitly 
provided for finance contingent on growth. Since then, most programmes incorporated in 
their design growth-promoting policies. For low-income countries, the programmes under 
the Extended Structural Adjustment Facility combined funds from the World Bank and 
the IMF to support growth-promoting policies. The programmes for highly indebted 
countries worked out policy packages to restructure both commercial and official debts to 
enable countries to repay the debts as their incomes increased. And in the early 1990s, 
growth became the principal concern in the programmes of the formerly socialist and 
transitional economies.  
III. Financing requirements of growth-oriented adjustments:  
The details of the policy prescriptions in growth-oriented programmes would naturally be 
different for different countries, depending upon their stage of development and the 
nature of their balance of payments problems as they adjusted their economies to global 
competition. But one common factor for all such programmes was the requirement of 
substantial financial support during the period of adjustment. Indeed, the experience of all 
countries that engaged in such adjustment programmes in the recent past indicated that 
whatever might be the specific policy targets, the successful implementation of these 
programmes crucially depended on the adequate and timely provision of finance.  
The nature of such financial support, however, would be quite different from those 
required to meet with problems like the Mexican crises of 1994, the East Asian crisis of 
1997 or the collapse of the Russian economy in 1998. These problems were related to the 
second stage of globalization, when developing countries had opened up their capital 
accounts, making them partially or fully convertible, and had become vulnerable to 
market failures even after receiving substantial flows from the capital markets. Although 
more and more developing countries, as they grew and accessed international capital 
markets over the years, would probably be facing similar problems, currently not more 
than 20 countries are concerned. The overwhelming bulk of developing countries are 
involved with problems of growth-oriented adjustment at the first stage of globalization, 
that of opening up to international trade with current account convertibility. These 
countries would have to adjust to international prices of goods and services and their 
fluctuations and changing supplies.  
The IMF adjustment programmes are usually designed around a financial exercise to 
estimate the financial support a country will need to carry out the programmes. The basic model of that exercise was developed in the 1960s by Polak and his associates.
13 The 
specification of some of the relations, occasionally incorporating additional variables and 
the judgments exercised in the processing of data and the identification of the variables, 
differed from country to country and from time to time. But the nature of the exercise has 
remained practically the same. A target is first fixed for the improvement of the balance 
of payments of the country during the programme period, measured by changes in net 
international reserves. To this is added an estimate of net imports, measured by a 
projection of import requirements over and above the estimate of exports for the period. 
This total is then adjusted for all committed capital flows, such as debt repayments or 
disbursements of loans previously arranged. The residual gives the additional net 
international financing that will be needed during the period. By subtracting from this 
amount an estimate of other possible inflows of foreign investment and balance of 
payments support from other bilateral, multilateral and commercial sources, the IMF 
determines the amount that will have to be financed from the IMF sources.  
In actual practice, because of the limitations of data and of properly identified 
relationships between different variables, most of these estimates are carried out based on 
judgments that are often rudimentary and arbitrary and influenced by extraneous factors. 
Estimates of exports are, more often than not, simple upgrading of projections of past 
trends, unable to capture the effects of devaluation and other policy changes. In effect 
these estimates really become targets that the officials judge to be plausible. Import 
requirements in most cases are endogenously determined by relating them to the levels of 
output, seldom using the effects of other variables, including changes in prices or 
exchange rates that take time to work themselves out. As a result, the entire estimate of 
net imports – required imports minus projected exports – becomes judgmental, and more 
often than not they are fixed by working backwards from the IMF’s estimate of available 
financing from other donor governments, multilateral agencies and possible commercial 
sources, and a minimum drawal of its own resources.  
This method of estimation is inherently biased towards under-financing the adjustment 
programmes. Instead of an independently estimated net import requirement and a target 
increase in reserves determining the amount of finance the Fund should provide to 
support such programmes, it is the finance that the IMF chooses to provide that 
determines the sustainable net imports and incremental reserves. The IMF is usually quite 
reticent about deploying its resources, which are taxpayers’ money provided by different 
governments as quota subscriptions, and which are supposed to be used for temporary 
financing, recoverable within a short time with interest. The conditionalities the Fund 
usually imposes on borrowing countries are as much motivated by improving the policies 
of the countries as by ensuring the repayment possibilities of the funds it lends. As the 
risk of default increases with the severity of the balance of payments problem of the 
borrowing countries, the Fund’s reticence in providing them with substantial assistance 
increases – just when they are badly needed.  
The Fund often tries to rationalize its under-funding as playing the role of a catalyst in 
attracting finance from other private and institutional sources. There is of course some 
validity in the argument that if the Fund is seen to be supporting a country’s adjustment programme through its normal phases of disbursement, this indicates that the country is 
fulfilling the performance criteria and the related conditionalities. This should improve 
the country’s credit rating and investor confidence in the sustainability of its policies, 
which should attract additional finances from international capital markets and augment 
the supply of investible resources to the country. This does not, however, mean that the 
government’s budget will have more resources. It has been seen in many cases that the 
binding constraints on the implementation of the adjustment programmes have not been 
so much the overall savings gap or imports gap of the country, as the widening resources 
gap of the government that raises the fiscal deficit. The IMF lends money to the 
government to augment its resources and to help finance its expenditures in a non-
inflationary way. So, the under-financing of the Fund-supported adjustment programmes 
would impact adversely on the implementation of the programmes and the outcomes of 
the policies.  
However, if the Fund’s catalytic role actually succeeds in attracting additional investible 
resources to the country from capital markets, it will facilitate raising the rate of growth 
of the economy. In that case, even if it does not immediately provide additional fiscal 
resources to the government, it will do so over a few years, raising more revenues from 
increasing income. What will then be required is the provision of adequate finances at 
least for the initial period, until the growth rate of the economy picks up to yield 
additional revenues to the government. The total amount of the finance provided by the 
Fund during this period may turn out to be much less than the total that would be needed 
over a number of years if growth rates did not pick up early, and if initial provisions are 
inadequate and less than that required in every year. In other words, the amount of the 
support required from the Fund would depend very much upon the phasing of that 
support, and it is more likely than not that if the programme is fully funded, both up front 
and in the initial years, the country should be able to graduate out of a dependence on the 
Fund sooner than expected. This is assuming that the Fund programmes are growth-
oriented and the economy moves on to a sustainable path of growth within a few years of 
implementing such programmes.  
The experience of the IMF in supporting adjustment programmes of developing 
economies has been, generally speaking, quite the contrary. The countries that have 
entered Fund-supported programmes have only on a few occasions graduated with 
success, fulfilling its balance of payments and sustainable output growth targets. More 
often than not either it gets off track in the midst of a programme, abandoning it 
completely, or it adopts further programmes to make mid-course corrections of policies 
and meet the repayment obligations of the previous programme. As a result, the 
involvement of a country with Fund programmes appears to be very prolonged, through 
repetitive short- or medium-term programmes piling up a very large total of financial 
assistance from the Fund over a number of years. The Fund is often not successful either 
in satisfactorily completing the process of adjustment, or in limiting the amount of 
financial support provided to the country. Indeed under-funding a programme, when it is 
needed initially, often ends up in prolonged funding of adjustment programmes of a much 
larger amount.  In sum, there are three major lessons to learn from the history of Fund-supported 
adjustment programmes. First, these adjustment programmes must be growth-oriented, 
and policies should be so designed as to not limit themselves solely to achieving a 
balance of payments equilibrium in the short-run. A country is expected to adjust to 
changes in the terms of trade and the relative prices for different sectors when it opens up 
to world trade and convertible current accounts. But for a developing country, a short-run 
balance of payments equilibrium is not sustainable unless it is accompanied by growth of 
income and output that would require specific policies beyond opening up trade and 
current accounts and not depending upon their trickle-down impact on GDP, savings and 
investment. Those policies would in turn involve augmenting the domestic supply of 
investible resources to realize the potential growth of output, and would require much 
more financial support than envisaged in the original concept of the balance of payments 
support for adjustment to international prices.  
In the Bretton Woods framework, a country was expected to require only limited support 
in adjusting to changes in relative prices resulting from opening up to international trade. 
The improved allocational efficiency would raise the level of output and improve the 
balance of trade by raising the level of net exports of the country following the lines of 
comparative advantage. Financial support is required only because the increase in net 
exports is not instantaneous, and that time can be reasonably short if all obstacles to free 
movement of goods and services are removed and the market system is fully flexible. The 
IMF support was meant to help the country defend the exchange rate without disrupting 
the policies of freeing trade and payments.  
For growth-oriented adjustment programmes, special measures are necessary because the 
static gains in the level of GDP due to improved allocational efficiency from freeing 
international trade and current accounts transactions are not expected to raise the rates of 
savings and investment sufficiently to significantly raise the rate of growth.
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in the level of GDP could of course raise the rate of savings if the marginal rate of 
savings were higher than the average. But given the rigidities of the production structures 
and movement of resources in developing countries, the extent of the gain in GDP would 
be too small to be effective in a few years. In other words, the static efficiency gains 
would not be quickly converted into dynamic efficiency gains of higher savings and 
investment leading to higher growth. The country will have to depend upon the trickle-
down effects of short-term gains in output from improved efficiency into a gradual rise of 
output growth over a rather long period. If no supplementary policies are taken to push up 
the rate of investment and accelerate the rate of growth, the adjustment programmes 
would be stuck at stagnant if not falling levels of output, and would very likely be 
disrupted.  
The second lesson to learn is that the immediate outcome of the opening up of a country 
to free international trade and payments can be quite adverse. At first, there would be an 
increase in the level of imports and a deterioration of the balance of trade. Several 
import-substituting industries will contract and the labour engaged in them would 
become unemployed. The export industries will of course become more profitable and 
their production should expand and exports should increase. But they would require both time and capital investment. The length of time required would depend upon the 
flexibility of the system – how fast resources can move from one place to another and 
how soon workers and managers can be retrained or recruited for the sound industries. 
Similarly, the machinery and equipment of the units that would close down facing 
competition are not like mecano sets. What will be required are new investments in the 
new units with new technology and new equipment, and even if the value of these new 
investments does not much exceed the value of old investments in the wound-up units, 
these cannot be regarded as replacements. The new investments in the new units will be 
determined by the prospective rates of return in these units, appropriately weighted by 
risks about the prospective growth of demand for the products, which in turn would 
depend upon the prospects of stability of the country’s policies. Even if the prospective 
rates of return or profitability of the new industries are quite high, the perceived risks 
about the sustainability of the overall growth of the economy and of the projected sectoral 
demand may render such investments unattractive or create a situation where investors 
would rather adopt a "wait and see" approach before locking in their funds for a long 
term.
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If investments are not forthcoming in these activities, the supply of exportables will not 
increase, and the projected growth of exports will not be realized. With imports 
increasing due to the opening up of the economy, the balance of trade of the country will 
deteriorate, calling for even larger flows of foreign capital, or in the absence of such 
flows from private and other sources, for even larger financial support from the IMF. If 
such financing is not available, the country will have no option except reversing the 
policy of liberalization of foreign trade and imposing controls on imports. That would 
raise the profitability of import substitutes relative to exports, and reduce incentives to 
increase exports, compounding the problems further. Alternatively, attempts will be made 
to suppress aggregate demand to reduce the growth of imports, and in the process reduce 
the growth of output and the overall profitability of investment. The private investors 
who were reluctant to lock in their funds in long-term investment would find their 
reluctance justified, because the falling growth of output and overall demand would have 
reversed the initial liberalization policies.  
In an underdeveloped economy the constraints of limited availability of infrastructural 
services and other complimentary inputs for exporting activities are more binding than in 
industrial economies. A shift in the relative price in favor of export activities would more 
easily attract and absorb investment increasing the supplies in industrial economies than 
in developing economies. A substantial investment in power, transport, communication 
and ports as well as export services infrastructure must take place simultaneously, if not 
prior to directly expanding capacities in the exports sector of developing countries. Any 
investment in an exporting activity would thus require a multiple of that investment in 
related activities for viability. So in an adjustment programme of a developing economy 
at the first stage of globalization, there has to be a much greater provision of investment 
than in industrial countries. If private and other institutional investors from the capital 
markets can not adequately provide for them, the IMF has to provide that additional 
support. An under-funding of that would disrupt the adjustment programmes.  The third lesson from the experience of Fund-supported adjustment programmes is that 
Fund support should be provided up front or as much as possible in the initial phase of 
the programme. As the main determinant of private investment is investor confidence in 
the stability of the policies adopted by governments in pursuance of adjustment 
programmes, investors from both the domestic and international capital markets would 
frequently adopt a "wait and see" approach until they are confident that policies will not 
be reversed and that the growth of output and employment will be sustained. During that 
period, it is imperative that the IMF fully funds the programme even if other sources of 
finance play truant.  
Besides the scale of funding such adjustment programmes, it is also important that they 
should offer medium to long-term financing, with some concessionality in the interest 
rates. The IMF itself recognized the importance of such qualitative requirements of 
finance when it first set up its Extended Financing Facility and then its concessional 
Structural Adjustment Facility, and later the Extended Structural Adjustment Facility. 
The normal funding pattern of the IMF is of a revolving fund for 3 to 5 years at interest 
rates related to the treasury rates of member governments, because of the monetary nature 
of the Fund using quota resources that are like the reserves of different Central Banks. 
The Fund had to make special arrangements for providing extended periods of finance 
with concessionality through these facilities by raising money directly from the 
governments or by using profits from sales of its gold stocks. By their very nature, the 
size of funds raised through such arrangements would be much more limited than the 
quota resources of the IMF. If successful implementation of the adjustment programmes 
called for large amounts of such long-term concessional finances, then either aid finance 
from governments would have to be mixed with the quota resources to make them 
concessional and usable for long-term financing or other international agencies that 
provide long-term finance have to join with the Fund.  
IV. Financial management of the first phase of globalization  
The above analysis would suggest that the IMF has a major role to play in the financial 
management of developing countries going through what may be described as the first 
phase of globalization. During that phase developing countries would open up to 
international trade and current account convertibility almost in the same manner as the 
industrial country members of the IMF opened up in the post-Bretton Woods period. For 
quite some time after the Bretton Woods conference, the opening up process for 
industrial countries was slow and hesitant – until the Marshall Plan for the European 
economies and U.S. support for Japan helped these countries to reconstruct themselves. 
By the 1960s and 1970s, most industrial countries had made their current accounts fully 
convertible, reducing exchange controls on current transactions to the minimum and 
removing most of the barriers to their trade in goods and services. Several rounds of 
GATT negotiations accelerated the opening up of international trade and IMF 
surveillance of the rules of transactions and financial support when necessary helped the 
process of current account convertibility. When the fixed exchange rate system of the 
Bretton Woods period broke down in the early 1970s, most industrial countries moved 
towards flexible exchange rates, freeing monetary policies from the constraints of maintaining par values. That paved the way for their capital account convertibility and 
their second phase of globalization, so that by the 1980s most industrial countries were 
more or less fully integrated, in the sense that the outcomes of any single country’s 
policies and activities became dependent upon other country’s policies and activities.  
Most developing countries, even after becoming signatories to the IMF articles and the 
GATT agreements, resisted the process of globalization and integration with the world 
economy by invoking special clauses that allowed them to be exempted from full trade 
liberalization or current account conversions. Still, quite a few of them needed frequent 
and substantial support from the IMF to meet their balance of payments problems even 
with their partial and slow process of opening up to globalization. Their economies had to 
adjust to the changes in their terms of trade and the resulting changes in the set of relative 
prices, the methods of payments and the servicing of accumulated debts. During the 
Bretton Woods period of fixed exchange rates, they had to defend the par values of their 
currencies. Even after the fixed exchange rate system broke down, most of them pegged 
their currencies. The consequent constraints on their monetary as well as fiscal policies 
very often dictated the design of their adjustment policies.  
The main difference between the industrial countries and the developing countries 
adjusting to the first phase of globalization, as we have argued above, is that the success 
of the adjustment policies for developing countries depended very much upon (a) their 
design as growth-oriented adjustment programmes, and (b) the adequate availability of 
funding for these programmes. These two requirements would remain essential whether 
the opening up was partial or complete, gradual or rapid. On both these accounts, the IMF 
would have major roles to play. In designing these programmes, the IMF would have to 
move beyond simple and short-term balance of payments improvement programmes to 
medium-term structural adjustment programmes promoting overall growth. In mobilizing 
finance, the IMF must play the lead role of coordinator of funds from other multilateral, 
bilateral or even commercial sources in addition to providing finances itself.  
As we have seen, the financial requirements for full funding can be very substantial. If 
the IMF’s own resources are inadequate, it must be able to catalyze funds from other 
sources. In the early years, when international capital flows from private sources to 
developing countries were insignificant or confined to limited amounts of direct 
investment flows to a few selected countries, the IMF would have to link its support to 
assistance from bilateral aid donors or multilateral development agencies. In recent years, 
when the overwhelming bulk of international capital flows come from private sources, 
the IMF’s or other multilateral agencies’ financial support should be able to leverage 
additional flows from the private sources, either by appropriate design of policies or 
through risk-sharing or complementary investment measures. In either situation, the IMF 
has to play a major role as catalyst of additional finance.  
The clear implication of the IMF playing such a role in accordance with the responsibility 
given to it by the international community at the time when it was created, of managing 
international finance and promoting the development of an open world trade and 
payments system, is that if it fails to catalyze funds from all other sources, it has to fill the gap itself. In other words, the countries that adopt such adjustment programmes must be 
certain that if they follow the policies agreed upon and if they fulfill the performance 
criteria, they would receive the full financial support required to implement these 
programmes. As we have seen, it is the certainty that the policies of adjustment adopted 
by the authorities of the developing countries will be carried through that lends stability 
to their policy environment, which is the most important determinant for investor 
confidence. Ensuring full funding of the programmes, whether directly from the IMF or 
in combination with financing from other sources is, therefore, essential.  
During the ‘80s and ‘90s, the first phase of globalization of developing countries - 
opening up to international trade and payments, and getting integrated with each other 
through current account convertibility – was accelerated and almost universalized. Most 
countries adopted major economic reforms liberalizing the internal and external 
movement of goods and services, adjusting their production structures and monetary, 
fiscal and exchange rate policies to a freer trade and payments system. However, 
although almost all these countries made significant progress towards current account 
convertibility, very few of them adopted measures for making their capital accounts 
convertible. Their globalization process, therefore, remained confined to the first phase, 
when the integration of their economies was being effected more through the markets of 
trading in goods and services and of current payments, and not so much through capital 
markets for free cross-border movements of savings and investments.  
This first phase of globalization of the developing countries is expected to last for quite 
some time, as the overwhelming majority of these countries are still far short of being 
graduated to the second phase of integration through capital markets. As these countries 
would be facing all the problems of adjustment in the first phase, they would depend on 
the IMF for the balance of payments support in accordance with the original articles of 
agreement. Only if they can successfully implement their programmes – adjusting 
production structures along the lines of their comparative advantage and producing 
sustainable growth – will private investment from international capital markets flow into 
these countries. It is then that they would be moving to the second phase of globalization.  
It is imperative, therefore, that during this phase the IMF is bestowed with sufficient 
internal resources through increases in quotas or through the creation of SDRs so that it 
can meet the full financing requirements of adjusting countries. It should try to attract or 
catalyze financing from other sources, but in cases where such outside finances fall short, 
the IMF should step in to make the programmes fully funded. The developing countries 
have for a long period, beginning with the Working Group Report of the G-29 in 1986, 
called for the creation of a Contingent Financing Facility out of the Fund’s own 
resources. It should be available to all adjusting countries, meeting the performance 
criteria of their adjustment programmes if the available finance from all other sources 
falls short of the expected or of the requirement, over and above the standard adjustment 
finance from the IMF on account of these programmes. It may be necessary to revive that 
proposal, and not limit it only to countries facing financial crisis or creating systemic 
problems.  The principles of such contingency facility can be summarized as follows. If according to 
a standard adjustment programme, whether under EFF or ESAF facilities, the IMF is 
expected to provide an amount X on the assumption that others would provide Y so that 
(X + Y) would fully fund these programmes and if due to some exogenous factors or 
unforeseen developments or errors in projection and judgment, the other sources provide 
finances less than Y, or (X + Y) falls short of the actual financial requirements, the 
Fund’s support should be raised beyond X to the amount necessary to fully implement the 
programme. This is provided, of course, that the country continues to implement policies 
according to the programme. The contingency financing should be automatic if the 
country fulfills all the performance criteria. If not there might be a review of the 
programme to judge if the country was doing the best it could in the situation and the 
programme could be disrupted if such financing were not available. In any case, the 
country concerned must feel assured that the international community, through the IMF 
was fully committed to supporting it in its adjustment process so long as the country was 
meeting all the obligations of following policies according to the programme.  
V. The Second Phase of Globalization – through integration of capital markets.  
The problems of financial management of the second phase of globalization, when the 
capital markets of the countries are being integrated, are quite different from those during 
the first phase. During the heyday of the Gold Standard, particularly from 1870 to 1914, 
when international trade and payments were conducted in currencies backed by and 
pegged to gold, the world witnessed high capital mobility and integration of the national 
economies. The system collapsed in the inter-war period and attempts to revive the gold 
standard failed with declines in capital mobility and disruptions in currency 
convertibility. When the Bretton Woods Conference re-engineered the international 
financial system and set up the IMF and the World Bank as the institutional pillars of the 
system, it aimed at integrating the world economy mainly through trade, but not capital 
movements. The IMF Articles of Agreement called for current account convertibility and 
full freedom of trade and payments for current transactions at fixed exchange rates. But it 
allowed the countries to maintain restrictions on capital flows on the assumption that 
complete freedom of capital movements may disrupt the orderly development of current 
account transactions for trade and payments. This arrangement persisted even after the 
fixed exchange rate system was given up in the early 1970s. But although no member of 
the IMF was obliged to remove their discretionary restrictions on capital account 
transactions, international capital movements registered a sharp increase in the 1970s and 
continued to increase steadily since then and many countries - especially industrial 
countries – relaxed restrictions on capital mobility. For those countries, the integration 
process went beyond the first phase through free current account transactions to the 
second phase of linking up through capital mobility.  
For most developing countries, the integration process has not progressed much further 
than the first phase, as they have not completely adjusted themselves to trade 
liberalization and current account convertibility, although almost all of them initiated that 
process during the 1980s and 1990s through Fund-supported adjustment programmes. 
That is why most of them have not been able to take advantage of high capital mobility and the phenomenal increase in international capital flows since 1995. The bulk of such 
capital flows remained confined to only a few developing countries, creating problems 
for them in adjusting to surges in capital flows. For most other developing countries, 
problems remained similar to adjusting to trade and payment liberalization and currency 
convertibility, requiring financial support from the IMF as discussed above.  
The conditions necessary for countries getting integrated through capital mobility are 
related to investors’ confidence, with or without full convertibility of their capital 
accounts. Investors from abroad must believe a country’s ability to sustain a process of 
development with stable policies and a reasonable rate of return on investment that 
should be transferable in foreign exchange. That is ensured when all current transactions 
are convertible and investment receipts are repatriable. It is not necessary that all capital 
inflows and outflows be allowed without any impediment. It would of course enormously 
help matters and contribute to investor confidence if capital accounts were fully 
convertible in addition to the freedom for all current transactions to be conducted in 
foreign exchange. But only a few countries, even in the industrial world, have such 
complete convertibility with all barriers on current and capital flows completely 
withdrawn. There would at least be some regulations imposed by supervisory agencies 
even in the most advanced market economies.  
Most developing countries, which received large investment flows from international 
capital markets, had different degrees of capital accounts convertibility. Some had 
succeeded in adjusting their economies to the opening up of their trade accounts and to 
changes in the terms of trade, interest rates and exchange rates in the process of their 
globalization and the increasing amounts of capital flows. Even with limited capital 
account convertibility restricted to repatriability of investment receipts and of investment 
incomes, they could receive large inflows of international capital and get engaged in the 
second phase of adjustment to globalization. The problems they faced and the financial 
support they required were qualitatively different from those of the first phase. For most 
of them the problems emerged after a reasonably long period of adjustment with growth 
that transformed their economies.  
There were also some countries which went for capital account convertibility in order to 
attract increasing capital inflows from the world capital market without successfully 
adjusting their economies to the first phase of globalization. They soon get into problems, 
both of liquidity and solvency, in sustaining the process of development and servicing the 
investment flows. They lost credibility and the confidence of the investors, which 
precipitated crises of reverse capital flows that convertible capital accounts could not 
cope with.
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Thus, measures to help developing countries face the process of opening up to the first 
phase of globalization adjusting to free trade and currency convertibility must be 
followed by policies to help them during the second phase of adjustment to high capital 
mobility and also capital convertibility. So long as the international capital market retains 
its buoyancy, investible funds, whether they are for direct investment, portfolio allocation 
or short-term flows, would be looking for investment outlets in developing countries where marginal productivity of capital is often very high and where the risk-weighted 
effective rates of return of investment could also be very high if the countries followed 
appropriate policies. In effect, if a country succeeds in adjusting its economy to the 
opening up of current accounts and is able to sustain its process of development with a 
stability of policies, the grounds get prepared for it to attract private capital from 
international markets. If there is even a marginal increase in the exposure of these 
countries to international capital markets, they may literally be flooded with capital flows 
that would quickly lead to the second phase of globalization. They will start getting 
integrated to the world economy not only by adjusting their productive activities to 
international prices of commodities and services but also by adjusting to changes in 
interest rates and exchange rates, to monetary and fiscal policies. As capital flows are 
absorbed and are deployed to earn the higher rates of return, countries move on to 
trajectories of higher growth of output and employment when the adjustment process is 
successful. Clearly such surges in capital flows can be initiated and sustained, even if 
capital accounts are only partially convertible, if successful adjustment of the first phase 
increases the productivity of investment and the confidence of investors in the 
sustainability of policies.  
Managing the adjustment of a country to increased capital flows or the second phase of 
globalization would require completing the first phase of adjusting the structure of 
production, trade and finance to international prices, and changing interest rates and 
exchange rates relative to domestic and international inflation rates. All this would call 
for policies similar to those during the first phase of adjustment through the improvement 
of macro-economic stability and balance of payments viability with sustainable economic 
growth. This would require the kind of financial support from international organizations 
like the IMF as we have already discussed.  
In addition to this, however, adjustment to the opening up to capital mobility may face 
the problem of a reversal in capital flows. The capital that came in as direct or portfolio 
investment or as short, medium or even long-term loans may withdraw themselves from 
the country, attended by capital flight or outflows of domestic savings, depending upon 
the degree of capital convertibility of the country. This can precipitate a major crisis in 
the economy. It may be very difficult to readjust its production and payments system to 
such reversal of capital flows. An equilibrium of relationships between the growth of 
outputs, trade, savings and investment together with increased foreign savings, when 
disrupted due to the withdrawal of foreign savings and flight of domestic savings, may 
not just be replaced by a lower level equilibrium, but may actually be thoroughly 
destabilizing with sharply falling output and savings, trade and employment.  
Such a disruption can take place for at least two reasons. First, policy mistakes and 
inability to successfully carry out the implementation of adjustment programmes may 
make investors lose their confidence. Secondly, either because of such loss of confidence 
or some exogenous developments or shocks, panic may exacerbate the loss of confidence, 
when investors and other economic agents compete with each other to exit with whatever 
funds they can secure by the sale of their assets or withdrawal of their deposits from 
domestic institutions.  It is important to keep the distinction between the two sources of problems in managing 
this second phase of globalization through capital mobility. The first is related to the 
problems of market development – of allowing the market forces to play their role fully 
in adjusting to the structure of the economy’s production, trade and financial system. The 
second is related to the problems of market failure. If the markets fail to give the right 
signal to the individual agents in the economy to behave appropriately toward an 
equilibrium that is optimal not only for the individual but also for the whole economy, 
there is a problem of market failure. That cannot be solved in the same manner as solving 
the problems of market development through increased competition and removal of 
barriers on the free play of market forces. More often than not in such cases, individuals 
following their own ‘rational’ maximizing behaviour reach an outcome that is sub-
optional or inefficient and unstable.  
Financial markets are proverbially prone to market failure, and the most important source 
of that market failure is imperfect information. Joseph Stiglitz and his associates have 
formally modeled the effects of imperfect information on the operation of market forces 
to show that they are so widespread as to make market failures endemic and almost 
universal unless corrected by appropriate policy intervention.
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markets, the prices of financial services more often than not fail to clear the market, and 
prices at which markets are cleared are not always the prices at which the profits of 
financial service providers are maximized. Unlike commodity markets, money in the 
capital market is exchanged for a promise of returns in the future, which is contingent 
upon not only what happens in the future, but also on how the economic agent behaves. 
So a financial market cannot run as an auction market and lenders do not simply lend to 
those who offer to pay the highest interest rates. A lender has to form judgments on the 
basis of whatever information is available about the probability of realizing the promised 
return. Because the borrower’s efforts affects returns on the loan and because of 
imperfect information, banks cannot stipulate all the actions that a borrower should 
undertake nor formulate the terms of the loan contract in such a manner that the borrower 
is induced to take the right action to make the outcomes of the loan a success. Similarly, 
by varying the price of loans (interest rates), banks may not be able to get the best 
allocation of loanable funds. Without full information about the projects, the banks 
cannot judge if the individuals who are willing to pay higher interest rates are not taking 
undue risks to undertake projects with lower probability of success but higher profits 
when successful.  
In their classic paper of 1981, Stiglitz and Weiss
18 showed that a loan market in a 
situation of imperfect information is often characterized by credit rationing, where the 
interest rates could be in equilibrium (in the sense that bankers would not have any 
incentives to change the rate once it is reached), but where there could still be an excess 
demand (in the sense that among loan applicants who appear to be identical, some receive 
a loan and other do not, and the rejected applicants would not receive a loan even if they 
offer to pay a higher interest rate). This is because the expected return for the bank 
increases less rapidly than the interest rate, and beyond a point it would actually decrease. 
This happens mainly because first, as interest rates increase, a higher proportion of riskier 
borrowers come for the loan. Second, a borrower may opt for a riskier project, because if the project succeeds he can take away the high profit but if it fails he expects to walk 
away with default as banks cannot fully monitor his actions. In other words, as the real 
interest rate increases, the probability of default on loan contracts also increases, resulting 
in less than proportionate increase in expected return. If the deposit rates offered by the 
banks are equal to their expected return, which would happen in a perfectly competitive 
model, the supply curve of loanable funds as a function of real interest rates would be 
backward bending. The real interest rates at which the demand for loans would be equal 
to the supply and the markets are cleared would be much higher than the rate at which the 
expected return would induce the maximum supply of loanable funds which would still 
fall short of the high demand for loans at the corresponding low real interest rates. As the 
market would not clear the demand and supply of loans, they would have to be naturally 
rationed out.  
Within the framework of the Stiglitz – Weiss model, the banks that are following prudent 
policies would on their own put a ceiling on their interest rates without being dictated by 
any regulatory authority. But if there is macro-economic instability with inflationary 
pressures and real exchange rate uncertainty, the expected return on bank loans may fall 
much below the actual rate of interest. If there is no regulatory authority trying to restrain 
the interest rates, the banks may try to take undue risks. The incentive to make high-
interest and therefore, high-risk loans can be very tempting, because a favorable outcome 
may lead to very high profits, while they can walk away when there are heavy losses. The 
default rates among the borrowers, at a time of crisis, may not be related if the banks 
concentrate lending to a few large borrowers. The tendency gets compounded if there is a 
deposit insurance cover, creating a real moral hazard. The expected profits from risky 
lending could be very high, because with favorable outcomes, banks would keep the 
extraordinary profits without paying the probability cost of incurring unusual losses, 
which can be passed on to insurance. The problem of moral hazard is multiplied when the 
banks are not privately owned, but run as public sector institutions with little risk of 
bankruptcy or loss of ownership claims when outcomes were unfavorable.
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The problems of imperfect information, and the related adverse selection and moral 
hazards of a domestic financial market are many times multiplied in the international 
financial markets. International financial institutions could reasonably well perform the 
agglomeration function of pooling together the savings of individuals in different 
countries, and the transfer function of transferring resources from savers of one country 
to investors in another country. But they would find it extremely difficult to perform the 
selection function (finding the best user in terms of yielding the highest expected 
returns); and the control function, which involves the principal-agent problem of inducing 
prudent behaviour of those who have been provided funds. The possibility of market 
failures in such situations is very large, and the problems do not get solved if the flows of 
funds expand, or if an institution like the IMF stands ready with substantial support if 
market failures occur. It will be necessary to have effective regulatory authorities both in 
the domestic and in the international financial markets – functioning in a framework of 
much greater transparency and with better flows of information and more effective norms 
of prudential behaviour by both the lenders and borrowers across the countries.  This is easier said than done, but two issues become clear in this context that need to be 
highlighted. First, if the IMF is a financial player, providing funds to clients to meet their 
requirements, it should be as much the subject of regulation as any other international 
financial institution. In that case, the IMF cannot be given the regulatory function over 
the international capital market, as proposed by many in recent deliberations. The 
international regulatory authority should be independent and separate from the financing 
institutions, even if their ownership is inter-governmental.  
Secondly, providing the IMF with more money to solve the problems of the failure of the 
financial markets is not going to be any help because the problems do not result from the 
lack of funds, but from the inability to use the funds properly. In other words, the role of 
the IMF in dealing with the problem of adjustment of countries to the second phase of 
globalization through high capital mobility and expanding international financial markets 
needs to be tackled differently from problems of the first phase of globalization. As seen 
above, the principle requirement then is increasing the IMF’s financial support.  
Another way of looking at the market failure problem of financial markets is to consider 
what Jeffrey Sachs describes as problems of multiple equilibria and problems of 
collective action or coordination.
20 Multiple equilibria in financial markets result from the 
dependence of the value of financial assets on market expectations while market 
expectations themselves depend upon the value of those assets. This is endemic in the 
nature of the assets that are traded in financial markets where current payments are made 
in exchange of the promises of future payments and where the value of those assets 
depends upon the perceived values of those promises. If the market expectations about 
the fulfillment of those promises change, the value of those assets will also change. 
Similarly, if the current value of the assets changes, market expectations about the future 
value of the assets also change. This circularity gives rise to the possibility of the 
economy landing into one or another equilibrium, in the sense that once it has landed into 
one, it would continue to remain in it. There is nothing in market behaviour that can 
move the economy from one equilibrium to another, no matter how desirable or 
undesirable the equilibrium position is.  
The classic example of such a multiple equilibrium problem is the value of bank deposits 
that are supposed to be converted into cash according to their face value on demand. But 
since it is the job of banks to use these deposits to lend to borrowers at different 
maturities, these deposits can maintain their face value only if a small proportion of these 
deposits are demanded for encashment at any time, and if banks are not required to call 
back their loans to meet that demand. But if for some reasons depositors fear that banks 
will not be able to meet their commitments – either because they have made bad 
investments or because the overall conditions of the economy have deteriorated – it is 
quite rational for a depositor who expects the total value of the bank’s assets to 
deteriorate to cash in his deposits before others. But if all or most depositors try to encash 
their deposits, the banks will have to recall their loans, lose the value of their assets and 
fail to meet their liabilities, leading to the depositors losing the value of their deposits. 
Note that even if the banks had made some bad investments, if all depositors were not 
rushing to withdraw their deposits, the banks should be able to meet the claims of the few depositors who might withdraw and adjust their investments to recover their position in 
time. The crisis is caused by the combined behavior of individual depositors expecting a 
fall in the value of the assets of the bank and therefore trying to be the first to redeem 
their deposits before others who were also expected to behave in the same way. The 
market expectation of a fall in the value of assets would actually lead to the fall in their 
value.  
It may also be noted that an improvement in the banks investment policies or operational 
efficiency would not be able to prevent the crisis if market expectations did not change 
and each depositor continued to believe that other depositors expecting a fall in the 
market value of the banks’ assets would withdraw their deposits. The only way to change 
the market expectation would be if the market expectations were not fulfilled – if the 
depositors saw that in spite of withdrawing their deposits, the value of the banks’ assets 
did not fall, and that the banks were able to meet their commitments. This would happen 
if the banks had recourse to some lender of last resort – a central bank from which they 
could borrow to meet the demand for liquidity of the banks’ depositors without recalling 
their own loans and impairing their values. There would then be a turn-around and the 
depositors would regain their confidence in the banks, expecting an improvement in the 
value of their assets. They would bring back their deposits, hold a larger portion of them 
as fixed deposits of longer maturities, facilitating the banks to lend to more long-term 
borrowers. All this would actually improve the value of their assets. If the bank's 
investment policy and efficiency improved, the turn-around would come sooner, but the 
basic cause of the market failure would have to be removed and the market expectations 
would have to be improved, in order to resolve the crisis.  
Bank runs caused by panicked expectations of bank failures had been a periodic feature 
of the financial system of capitalist industrial countries throughout the 19th and 20th 
centuries. Kindleberger, who chronicled the history of such financial crisis or panics, 
described them as market failures caused by the irrational behaviour of market agents or 
manias. He also traced the evolution of central banks functioning as lenders of last resort 
in the industrial countries.
21 Walter Bagehot in 1873 enunciated the role that the Central 
Bank could play by freely lending to banks facing runs, providing them with sufficient 
liquidity to meet the depositors’ demands. The depositors would then regain confidence 
that their deposits would be honoured at full value without running to the banks, which 
would break the expectations of panic.
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emerged in different countries, playing the role of lenders of last resort, helped by their 
roles as issuers of notes and as conductors of bank supervision. In the United Kingdom, 
the Bank of England was a private bank that developed into a state institution performing 
the functions of a Central bank. In the U.S. the Federal Reserve System was established 
in 1913 to play the role of a lender of last resort and of a central bank issuing notes.  
Since the creation of the IMF at the Bretton Woods Conference, the international 
community has debated on whether the IMF would be assigned the role of a central bank 
of the central banks of different countries, with the power to supervise the functioning of 
the national central banks and their national monetary policies, as well as to issue notes as 
international lender of last resort. The IMF was given the power of supervising the monetary policies of the governments and the central banks that came to the Fund for 
financial assistance. The IMF was also allowed to issue SDRs, which are like legal 
tenders, but are acceptable only by central banks, and which are created not automatically 
by the Fund’s lending but only by an accord of the member governments. The IMF was 
also a sort of lender of last resort to central banks or national governments in the sense 
that the central banks could borrow from the IMF to meet their payment needs, but there 
were strict limits to their total borrowing related to their quotas and subject to time-
consuming negotiations and conditionalities. The IMF lending was really meant to help 
countries to tide over balance of payments problems that could be resolved through 
changes in policies. It was not meant to help countries withstand the pressures of panics 
or manias, which were to be resolved not so much by policy changes as by the supply of 
timely liquidity to resist deteriorating market expectations.  
But as countries were exposed to the phenomenal growth of capital mobility in the 1990s, 
and more and more countries became vulnerable to panics and capital flight abroad due to 
a collapse of market expectations, there was an increasing clamor to give the IMF the 
formal role of a lender of last resort. There are several forms in which financial panics 
could manifest themselves in international markets, due to a collapse in market 
expectations. In each case, an international lender of last resort could help countries 
withstand the reversal of market expectations and overcome the panic and impending 
financial crisis.  
Whether the IMF should play that role would have to be decided after carefully 
considering all the implications. For example, there may be a case of general creditor 
panic among the international banks when a sovereign government or the financial 
institutions of a developing country borrowed substantial funds in the short term. Under 
normal circumstances, with favorable market expectations and projections of growth and 
profitability in a stable policy framework, the short term loans would be rolled over or 
new loans would be made to complete the long-term investment programme. But if for 
some reasons the creditors lose confidence in the country’s ability to pay back the loans, 
or to convert the domestic currency pay offs into foreign exchange or the investment 
programmes taken up would not be completed, they may not agree to roll over the loans, 
or if they do, they may insist on a sharp rise in the interest rates at which many of the 
investment projects already undertaken and only partially completed, may become 
unviable. If such investments fail, the country’s ability to pay back the loans already 
undertaken gets impaired, and the new loans, if approved would require very high rates of 
return, not only to pay for themselves but also to service the past debt. If this does not 
appear to be feasible, it would be rational for individual creditors to withdraw before 
others do, and if all creditors follow their individually rational course of action the 
investment programmes would be disrupted, the creditors will lose their money, and the 
value of their assets will be grossly impaired.  
There are two aspects of the problem that should be clearly distinguished. If there are 
policy failures leading to the impairment of investment projects already initiated or the 
transferability of the pay off becomes uncertain, they have to be tackled by improving 
policies. This would not require any lender of last resort, although international institutions like the IMF or the World Bank may have to provide financial assistance to 
the countries to implement the policy reform in the same manner as during the first phase 
of globalization. However, the problems may be caused mainly by market expectations 
when each creditor expects that the other creditors would withdraw because of a loss of 
confidence and therefore decides to withdrew himself before others do and thereby force 
the investment projects to be disrupted mid course. On such an occasion, a lender of last 
resort might be of help, allowing the investment projects to be completed and yielding 
enough returns to pay back both the old and the new loans. This would then break the 
market expectations and revive the creditors’ confidence, a process that would be helped 
if the country also corrected the policy failures, if any during that period.  
The Mexican crisis of December 1994 was an example of such creditor panic, when 
Mexico was unable to rollover its short-term public debts. With $29 billion in dollar-
denominated debts (tesobonos) falling due in 1995, the Mexican central banks had 
reserves of only $6 billion and the December devaluation set off a creditor panic when 
each potential tesobono purchaser feared that if other creditors refused to roll over their 
debts, Mexico would face a default. The interest rates increased sharply to reflect the 
default risk, and with little roll over of the debts, Mexico was pushed into a crisis. This 
was met by the IMF with an unprecedented scale of support to Mexico, together with 
support from the United States as a loan package as if from a lender of last resort. That 
loan package succeeded in keeping Mexico out of default and in dissipating the creditor 
panic.
23  
Another possible example of the role of a lender of last resort is when there is a panic 
regarding the value of a country’s currency. If for some reason residents lose confidence 
in the sustainability of the value of the domestic currency, they would reduce the holding 
of the currency and shift to other assets or to other currencies. If the fiscal deficit of a 
country is financed by seigniorage or increasing the supply of high-powered money that 
people are willing to hold and if there is no reduction in that fiscal deficit, it will be 
necessary to increase the supply of money, if the residents demand for holding money 
falls to finance the same deficit. As a result the value of the currency will fall further, 
reducing further the demand for holding that currency.  
Again if the loss of confidence in the value of the currency is due to policy failures, such 
as uncontrolled fiscal deficits or an unviable exchange rate policy, any programme for 
regaining the confidence must change these policies. But if the panic leading to the flight 
from the currency is caused by market expectation feeding on itself – a shift from 
domestic currency to foreign currency in the expectation of exchange rate depreciation 
and fulfilling that expectation or in ensuring inflation leading to a further fall in the value 
of the currency and further depreciation – it could be met effectively by a lender of last 
resort. By increasing the supply of foreign exchange, the market expectations of 
exchange rate depreciation can be reversed, provided the policy failures, if any, are 
corrected.  
Thus, if the IMF can effectively play the role of the lender of last resort, it can be very 
useful in solving the problems of market failure, which are caused by market exceptions and multiple equilibria. But this function of the IMF should be clearly differentiated from 
the IMF’s role as provider of supporting finance for adjustment programmes and policy 
reforms of countries going through the first phase of globalization and of opening up to 
world trade and current payments.  
There are two major requirements for the Fund to play this role effectively. First, a lender 
of last resort must be able to provide assistance at the first sign of crisis so that the 
adverse exceptions do not get a chance to be self-fulfilling. This would call for a prior 
clearance of the programmes or some arrangements that the countries hoping to receive 
such assistance would be under a policy discipline before any crisis actually hits them. In 
the language of the IMF, these countries should be under a shadow programme, fulfilling 
all the performance criteria regarding appropriate policies, but without drawing any 
financial support from the IMF, as capital markets would be expected to provide all the 
finance that is required. This would also ensure that the crisis if it hits the country would 
be essentially the result of market failures of adverse expectations and not very much due 
to policy failures or at least not due to policy mistakes that could be detected ex ante.  
Secondly, the finance provided by the lender of last resort must be adequate to fight the 
adverse market expectations. At least the line of credit that would seem to be available to 
the country must be large enough to make the speculators realize that their attack on the 
country might be too costly for themselves. Actual drawal of the funds might turn out not 
to be large, if the market expectations are reversed early. But the provision of funds that 
could be potentially drawn upon must be sufficient to break the chain of expectations.  
The scale of finance necessary to effectively play such a role of lender of last resort may 
actually be very large. Since the countries involved would be relatively developed, 
receiving substantial capital inflows, a panic that reverses such flows into capital flight 
might need be very substantial fund to withstand the speculative pressures and revive the 
creditors and investors’ confidence. So, if two or three countries need help at about the 
same time – which would often be the case because any financial crisis that hits one 
country has a tendency to hit several countries at a time – then most of the resources of 
the Fund would be exhausted, leaving very little to assist other countries facing the 
balance of payments problem of the first phase of globalization.  
In re-engineering the international financial system, it would be necessary to address this 
basic question – what are the priorities in using the Fund’s resources. These resources are 
mainly derived from the Fund’s quotas, which are taxpayers’ money contributed by the 
different governments according to some agreed criteria based on the financial strength of 
the different countries. Unlike the World Bank, the IMF normally does not borrow 
money from the capital market. The interests that have to be paid for the use of such 
resources are related to the average interests that treasuries of the different governments 
have to pay on their borrowings, plus some transaction costs, and more often than not, 
such interest rates are much cheaper than the market rates. Although every effort should 
be made to expand these resources, it would still be necessary to use these resources 
prudently according to priorities.  It has also been seen above that the main shortcoming of the Bretton Woods system of 
adjustment of countries to globalization is that their programmes remain underfunded. 
For most developing countries the financing of these programmes on market terms may 
be too costly to be used effectively. Besides, most developing countries are still in their 
first phase of globalization, requiring substantial finance for carrying out their adjustment 
programmes from the IMF, supplemented by long-term development finance from the 
World Bank and other development agencies. The recent increases in the quotas of the 
Fund would still be insufficient to meet the requirements of funding such programmes. A 
diversion of a substantial part of these quotas to perform the task of the lender of last 
resort to few developing countries that have moved to the stage of adjusting to increased 
capital flows would leave the programmes of most of the countries under-funded, 
therefore under-implemented.  
But if quota resources are not to be used in its functioning as a lender of last resort, how 
would the IMF, if it has to perform the role, secure the necessary finance that is quick 
disbursing and adequate? A possible answer is to replicate the existing schemes of the 
General Agreement to Borrow (GAB), which can be invoked to meet a "systemic" crisis. 
These are schemes of a prior agreement among the Central Banks and the governments, 
to open a line of credit when the IMF has to assist countries coming out of a systemic 
crisis. It is possible to have different variations of the schemes in principle, and the 
agreement may extend beyond the government and the central banks to major 
commercial banks with substantial stakes in the revival of the affected countries and 
resolution of their crisis. Even for normal adjustment finance of these countries, the Fund 
may use its limited quota resources to leverage funds from the capital market, rather than 
provide all the finance from its own resources. That would allow the Fund to leave most 
of its quotas for funding the adjustment programmes of the overwhelming bulk of the 
countries, which have very little access to the international capital market.  
There is another form of market failure that is related to collective and coordinated 
action, which may require a relatively small amount of the IMF finance to catalyze other 
sources of funds, but needs the IMF to play a more effective role of coordinator and 
promoter of collective action. The classic example of such a case is the debt adjustment 
problem of major debtors, who for some reason or other default in their debt servicing 
and who would face a major crisis if creditors chose to withdraw their debts even at a 
loss, and were not willing to provide new loans. What would often be necessary is some 
debt forgiveness (when individual creditors may like to free-ride, but collectively may be 
willing to share in the forgiveness), some sharing of the burden by all creditors, adopting 
procedures of the bankruptcy courts in many countries and ascribing "seniority" to 
creditors providing new loans so that they can be serviced first before others, and thereby 
ensuring new flows of credit that are essential to revive the economy. This would require 
the role of a coordinator among the creditors who can bring about such collective action, 
which the IMF can perform effectively if authorized internationally. The IMF would not 
require much finance for this purpose, but would need the authority to address the 
problem effectively.  
Conclusion  To sum up, the IMF still has to play a major role in managing international finance in a 
global economy. It has to distinguish its supportive role to countries adjusting their 
economies and their policies to the opening up of trade and current accounts from its role 
of support to countries which are open to receiving substantial capital flows from 
international capital markets. The Fund is seriously under-funded, requiring a substantial 
increase in quotas. It needs to be supplemented by other development banks. But it also 
requires the authority to redesign adjustment programmes, taking fully into account all 
the failures of the market. But more importantly, the Fund can play all the roles of a 
market leader and coordinator, not only of policies designed carefully to meet the specific 
requirements of globalizing developing countries, but also of raising funds to assist their 
economies in adjustment.  
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